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by ANTHONY SIL
Military equation does not add up
THE “downsizing” of the PNG Defence
Force (PNGDF) seems to assert a renewed sense of security,
surmounting in retrospect its perceived inabilities.
There appears to be a belief at Waigani and in Canberra that a
smaller PNGDF would be more effective because it would be
manageable in terms of resources and finance, and would harness
discipline as well as encourage soldiers capable of multifaceted
engagements.
For example, the murky experiences from Bougainville conflict and
Sandline Crisis seem to purport a lack of institutional capacity
and discipline. But inversely, there is an inherent vulnerability
of a “downsized” Defence Force to be relegated to a “Boys Scout”
camp.
Arguably Australia’s grand idea of capacity building through
downsizing encapsulates the PNGDF’s development in the past 30
years, including experience gained in both internal and regional
security roles, from peacekeeping missions to clandestine
operations and humanitarian engagements.
It seems Canberra’s vehement stance on downsizing has been
whimsically placated by Waigani with a biblical overtone. It is of
grave concern when our MPs herald mundane agendas such as a rise
in their housing allowances, discretionary funds and pro-elitist
amendments to laws governing NCD, but silently greet other
proposals such as the PNGDF’s downsizing.
The PNGDF is an indispensable apparatus of State power that must
be harnessed to cater for both domestic and regional needs.
To what extent in resources and capabilities can a downsized PNGDF
be endowed to respond to security concerns is a moot issue. The
initial size of 5,500 is reasonable for a country of more than
five million people.
Former army chief Gen (rtd) Jerry Singirok has remonstrated with
the Government the security implications of the downsizing. His
views deserve consideration by the National Executive Council.
The initial size of 5,500 has been cited as one cause for the
Government’s failure to adequately fund services.
The reduction of the PNGDF seems to be equated with optimal
benefit analysis of national income, where cost saving would be
infused into other Government services.
Since independence, the PNGDF has received a respectable
allocation from the annual budget.
Aid, especially from Australia and New Zealand, has also helped a
lot in keeping the force at a functional level.
Over the years, however, the PNGDF has been criticised for being
costly to maintain, and low in discipline and capabilities to
address national and regional security concerns.
Factors such as poor economic growth, poor trade balance, poor
governance, depreciation of the Kina amongst others, have starved
the PNGDF of resources to the extent that some divisions are
seemingly inoperable.
Secondly, the orthodox reason of having a defence force seems to
have become obsolete in view of the remote potential of any
external threat of war.
But the question is: How can PNG equate the strength of a
downsized PNGDF with the demands of its population both internally
and regionally against new security threats in the 21st Century?
Whatever the area of “development” or Government services, such
“cost-saving” is projected to enhance, there is an inherent irony
of economic cost in manpower immobility as a corresponding effect
of dismantling the initial capacity of the PNGDF, which otherwise
can be effectively integrated to address civil society needs.
Potential coup
Australia seems to talk despairingly
of PNG’s vulnerability to facing a military coup upon observing
the experiences of other third world countries.
This one-size-fits-all analysis is understandable as Australia
cannot afford to bear the rippling effects on its security, and
economic interests in PNG if the PNGDF were to take over the
Government.
Such geo-strategic consideration is inevitable given PNG’s
proximity to Australia, where a military regime in the former can
create volatile diplomatic relations between the two vis-ŕ-vis the
South Pacific and South-East Asia.
But such sentiment is a leap in the dark and gross underestimation
of the intellect and professionalism of our military officers.
The PNGDF have endured well in the face of insufficient funding,
the Sandline Crises, Bougainville conflict and National Executive
Council politicking over the years.
They are committed to nationalism and constitutional democracy.
Moreover, there is a realm of checks and balance, given the
conglomeration of officers representing wider ethnic groups where
any disgruntled officer cannot effectively mobilise the PNGDF for
a military coup.
Containing ethno-nationalist upsurges
Ethno-nationalist upsurges as in the
case of Bougainville conflict has challenged the legitimacy of the
State.
It provides the case to argue that PNG’s political system failed
to promote national unity or cultivate a healthy political culture
necessary for State building.
Ethno-nationalism is a secessionist movement; a form of political
opposition that is directed not merely against a particular
government or a constitutional regime, but against the legitimacy
and authority of the State itself.
PNG is vulnerable to more of such upsurges, which the experience
of PNGDF in Bougainville can go a long way in developing an
internal conflict de-escalation mechanism.
Any argument that such vulnerability to any upsurges is
hypothetical must never lose focus on the challenges, which time
will bring forth to PNG’s internal sovereignty.
In general, factors such as increasing demands for Government
services from an increasing population, pandemic unemployment,
fluid political system, endemic corruption, and increasing demands
for autonomy and ethno-regional politics provide the recipe to
induce and escalate civil disorder.
Regional peacekeeping
The Pacific Islands Forum (PIF)
provides the platform for a regional security framework but any
development by the participants to develop a conflict
de-escalation mechanism is still at its primacy.
The lessons from Fiji’s military coups, Solomon Islands’ ethnic
upsurges, Tonga’s factional upsurges against its king and PNG’s
Bougainville conflict demand the PIF to be prepared for future
regional conflicts.
There is a need to improve on the experiences of Solomon Islands’
Ramsi and Bougainville conflict resolution.
Foremost, all South Pacific countries must work collectively
through treaties of compliances to rules of engagement.
The need to build a regional security structure through the PIF
will go a long way under Chapter 48 of the United Nation Charter,
which implicitly states that regional organisations must help in
peace building.
But this may be an unlikely achievement given that the PIF seems
to be oscillating its ideals precariously between Australia’s
interests, and the reluctance of member states to confer portions
of their sovereignties to the grouping.
In other words, the absence of a regional security structure and
enduring cultural and political idiosyncrasies amongst Pacific
Island countries bestow Australia’s middle power pre-eminence with
the leverage to bilaterally negotiate with carrots and sticks.
This can constrict any multilateral diplomatic means that
otherwise should be the cornerstone of the PIF as a regional
organisation.
Sea borders
One of the major national security
threats faced by States in the 21st Century is trans-national
crimes.
Our navy is unfortunately ill-equipped to counter people
smuggling, drug smuggling, illegal arms trade, illegal fishing and
other such illegal acts.
This negates the efforts of other state institutions such as the
Internal Revenue Commission (in managing trade volumes), the Bank
of PNG (in giving reliable micro and macro economic projections),
the Investment Promotion Authority (in monitoring foreign
investments and business practices) and Department of Trade and
Foreign Affairs (in managing trade regimes and diplomacy).
If Australia is concerned about the rippling effects of such
transnational crimes in PNG, then it should have the foresight to
build the capacity of the navy. Strangely, it likes to label PNG
as a “failed State”.
On balance, it is true that the wantok system and poor governance
amongst others do warrant Australia’s help (the Enhanced
Cooperation Programme being one example) but this is a reactionary
approach to stabilising democracy and promoting State building.
It is an enigma for Australia to propagate that PNG can maintain
its sea borders with just 2,000 military personnel against the
demands for wider and interdependent specialisations within the
force.
For sure, PNG is neither “a strong” nor a failed State.
Perhaps a better classification for PNG would be “a State in
transition” from an accrued low level of legitimacy to address the
challenges of globalisation.
PNG needs to improve in governance and diversify its economy. In
this context, there needs to be a holistic policy approach to
establishing a national and regional security structure.
The PNGDF size of 5,500 is not a threat to democracy.
The Eminent Person’s Group Report of 1999-2000 that influenced the
downsizing of the PNGDF should be completely reviewed, rather than
be glossed over and propagated by “feel good” politicians and
“idealist” bureaucrats.
Strengthening PNG’s internal and external sovereignty requires
effective covert information gathering, skilful diplomacy (overt
approach) and adequately-resourced security forces.
There needs to be a holistic sectoral development policy to induce
economic growth.
Greater emphasis should be placed on:
(a) A complete, efficient and affordable air, sea and land
transportation system;
(b) Intra-regional free trade with less discrimination from
Australia;
(c) Free movement of peoples within the South Pacific;
(d) A liberalised telecommunication system;
(e) An agricultural production/food industry, and;
(f) A foreign investment policy that emphasises on appropriate
technology transfers geared towards promoting industrialisation.
The next elected government should put in place a long-term
development strategy to complement the current Medium-Term
Development Strategy.
Importantly, foreign aid utilisation needs to be accountable and
optimised in key development areas.
PNG also needs tougher laws to deter corrupt politicians and
public servants so that the uses of limited resources are
optimised and accountable.
This will also require a well-organised National Intelligence
Organisation, Criminal Investigation Branch, Ombudsman Commission,
Transparency International and objective investigative journalism
from the media fraternity.
PNG and other small island States should be serious in improving
intra-regional diplomacy through the PIF in order to harness and
diversify their inter-regional diplomacy with Asean, APEC, EU and
other regional blocs.
This can be effectively enhanced by a Common Pacific Parliament,
PIF constitution, treaties of compliances, common defence and
other consideration in emulating the EU, but varied to suit the
Pacific needs.
In conclusion, downsizing the PNGDF is only a façade by the PNG
Government to extenuate its endemic failures at good governance
that is systematically encouraging an elitist society, whilst the
grassroots are impoverished and marginalised below the cockroach
level.
The Government seems to be myopically adamant in seeing downsizing
from one dimension, rather than foreseeing the impending
psychological dynamics of Australian politics to entrench its
dependency control.
Without a regional security policy and structure, Australia will
continue to enjoy its inclination for unilateralism on security
matters by combining aid increments to foster long-term
post-conflict capitulation of small island states on its terms.
Reducing the PNGDF is a precarious move that entrenches its own
dependency and loss of legitimacy.
The momentum of globalisation demands states to use the notion of
sovereignty in the relative sense as opposed the absolute sense.
This is where the PIF comes in, but only when all member states
respect each other and cooperate towards their common regional
interests.
*The writer is a lecturer in
International Relations and Diplomacy at the University of PNG
 
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