By REGINALD RENAGI
AS Defence Minister, Bob Dadae holds a very powerful portfolio in the Government.
He must do better than his predecessors by facilitating some real long-term action within the ministry.
In view of several critical incidents within the PNG Defence Force (PNGDF) since 1997, I propose a broad “way ahead” for consideration by Parliament.
The Government needs to critically look at certain viable options to chart a new future course for our national security posture and to facilitate this, the PNGDF needs to re-engineer itself.
The first priority is to ensure that we have a “minimum credible force” for the defence of PNG and its national interests. 
The Government must now decide what our key national interests are and where our future security interests and requirements really lie. 
It then needs to work out how to get there and the resources needed.
The Defence Ministry must ask itself two basic questions: what should be the PNGDF’s future roles and whether it can adequately fulfil them.
In my view, the PNGDF’s current roles are inappropriate and that it is unable to continuously fulfil them with the resources available to it.  
In the absence of any external military threat, our security attention demands a new focus to deal with emerging threats to our country’s stability and security.
Its key roles, I believe, should be:
*Border security and patrol;
*Intelligence and surveillance;
*Maritime response and interdiction;
*Internal security and civic action (nation-building); and
*Regional stability and security.
We need to develop a highly-responsive and mobile defence force that can quickly react to low-intensity contingencies.
The emphasis should be on small unit operations, timely information, and a rapid response to focal areas. 
Economy of effort will dictate that military operations should be directed to known areas of vulnerability based on reliable information, and intelligence.
I propose three general options for the Government to consider:
1. No major change to the PNGDF’s structure, size, roles and responsibilities but make considerable improvements to its operational, financial and management efficiencies in core competence areas;
2. Refine the organisation of the land forces to three units and strengthen the capabilities of both the maritime and air force in terms of equipment, logistics support, manpower and specilised training.
3. Merge the maritime and air force into one operational entity – PNG National Coastguard Service. In times of conflict, it will form part of a future security force to meet constitutional requirements. 
The land element will form a rapid response paramilitary force component of the Royal PNG Constabulary in peacetime.
In defence emergencies or any future conflict, the land element will form part of the maritime/air force contingency element.
For years, the Government has shown an inability to adequately maintain and support the PNGDF. If the PNGDF is to be expected to effectively conduct its mission and other roles in future, a realistic annual budgetary outlay of about K200 million would be required.  
Moreover, despite constant changes to Defence Council members since 1997 and the best efforts of senior officers then, the PNGDF has failed to emerge as an effective force.
There are several reasons for this, but in general, the whole exercise still requires lots of personal effort by key stakeholders, commitment and resources.
The real challenge for the future well-being of PNG is what we can do to promote our country’s national security in most aspects. 
It is not just a question of no money as for many years now the Government has not committed itself to modernise our armed force, despite the worsening security situation each year.
While option 2 presents a preferable force structure, it has drawbacks as well.
In addition to the existing culture, senior defence management has a poor track record of effectively managing public funds.
As a result, the goal of reshaping the PNGDF into a top-notch outfit has fallen short of public expectations.
Under the present strategic circumstances, option 3 seems a most feasible and viable alternative for PNG in the next five years and beyond.
With a coastguard service, PNG will greatly justify the long-term benefits. 
An appropriately resourced coastguard will further contribute towards both national security and development in a much cost-effective manner.
In addition, a coastguard will effectively pay itself off many times over in any one year by its all-year round surveillance activities in support of government policies.
The offshore resource protection function includes both naval and coast guard missions conducted on behalf of several line agencies.
Despite several white papers and submissions to the National Executive Council, previous ministers have not served long enough to consolidate key reforms and improve organisational effectiveness.
*urge Dadae to now:
*Provide a more professional leadership and strategic direction;
*Commission a “task force” to systematically progress a major organisational efficiency review, and implement it on his watch;
*To develop option 3 for the Parliament to consider; and
*To initiate a clear long-term action plan to greatly enhance the ministry’s operations in future.
I suggest he convene a special defence sabbatical before the end of the year for experienced former defence officers and departmental executives to discuss with council members and key defence staff on how best we can effectively manage our defence and security challenges.
The key recommendations made there will form a future basis of a new defence White Paper for our government.
The sabbatical must be an all Papua New Guinean affair so as to prevent any foreign interference or influence.
 
Note: The author is a former PNGDF chief of staff and planning and is now a freelance writer and adviser to community advocacy interest groups.