B’ville referendum & beyond

Focus
As Bougainville prepares for a referendum on independence, Australia must navigate a policy response that acknowledges the history of conflict and colonialism there, Bougainville nationalism, PNG sensitivities, the principles of the guiding Bougainville Peace Agreement and new geostrategic realities to help forge a lasting solution. This is the first part of Ben Bohane’s feature on Bougainville

ON Nov 23 2019, Bougainvilleans will commence voting in a long-awaited referendum to decide whether they wish to stay part of Papua New Guinea or become an independent nation.
In a process that will take place over two weeks, voters will be asked whether they want Bougainville to have either “greater autonomy” or “independence”.
This is the culmination of a 20-year peace process which followed the end of a 10-year war on Bougainville that was the most intense conflict in the Pacific since the World War II.
The principles of the truce, enshrined in the Bougainville Peace Agreement (BPA) signed in Arawa on Aug 30, 2001 which formally ended the war, remain the primary framework to create a lasting peace.
The three main pillars of the agreement were the creation of the Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG), which occurred in 2005; weapons disposal; and, the referendum, to be held no later than 15 years after the formation of the ABG (that is, by 2020).
Based on current sentiment in Bougainville, it appears a majority of Bougainvilleans – perhaps three-quarters or more – will opt to vote for independence.
This is being driven by a range of factors: their long-standing sense of separate ethnic identity from PNG, residual animosity after the war years, a perceived failure of the current model of autonomy, and reservations about its future as part of PNG.
Bougainville is largely “referendum ready” and its people are expected to vote overwhelmingly for independence in the November referendum.
While the referendum may be a high point for the people of Bougainville, it is not the end point. Under the BPA, the vote outcome must be ratified by PNG’s national parliament and a “negotiated outcome” then struck between the PNG Government and the ABG.
An independent agency – the Bougainville Referendum Commission (BRC) – was formed in 2017 to conduct the referendum, overseen by a Joint Supervisory Body (JSB).
Australia has a significant stake in the outcome of the November referendum.
Bougainville’s war between 1988 and 1998 cost an estimated 10,000–15,000 lives and presented a major security challenge for PNG, Australia and their immediate neighbours.
Australia financed and provided personnel and logistics for several major peacekeeping operations on Bougainville over the years, beginning with a short-lived South Pacific Regional Peace Keeping Force (SPRPKF) in 1994 and finishing with a Truce Monitoring Group (TMG) and its successor, the Australian-led Peace Monitoring Group (PMG), which withdrew from Bougainville in 2003.
These were significant operations involving military deployments that cost Australia hundreds of millions of dollars.
Australia’s initial peacekeeping missions in Bougainville in the mid-to-late 1990s were arguably the most substantial Australian missions since Vietnam and presaged later Pacific interventions in Timor Leste and the Solomon Islands.
New Zealand also played a major role, leading the TMG and brokering peace agreements such as the Endeavour Accords in 1990, the Burnham Declaration of 1997, and the Lincoln Agreement in 1998.
These initiatives created a template, pioneered on Bougainville, whereby Australia and New Zealand gather neighbouring Pacific forces from countries such as Fiji, Tonga and Vanuatu to provide logistical and operational support for regional Pacific forces to take the lead, respecting traditional Melanesian culture (kastom) to ensure the missions are culturally sensitive and therefore effective.
A peaceful resolution to the Bougainville question is important for Australia.
It was a protagonist during the colonial period and subsequent conflict, and it has invested heavily in a largely successful peace process since.
Moreover, at a time of growing geopolitical contest in its immediate region, Australia and its regional partners will be keen to demonstrate they remain reliable security guarantors in the Pacific region.
Australia must be ready for a variety of possible situations, including: a refusal by the PNG parliament to ratify a vote for independence, which could lead to unrest; a rejection of the vote by PNG – or a delay on reaching settlement – which could lead to another unilateral declaration of independence by Bougainville; and finally, a substantial deterioration in the security situation, which could potentially require the deployment of another regional peacekeeping force or peace enforcement operation.
Bougainville is richly endowed with mineral resources such as copper, gold and silver, and such resources could contribute to underwriting a new nation state.
However, the potential for dispute and renewed conflict over mining rights is very real and adds to the tensions between PNG and Bougainville over the referendum.
If the people of Bougainville vote for independence as expected, it is not clear whether the PNG parliament will ratify that vote according to a timeframe acceptable to Bougainvilleans, or even ratify it at all.
Before Peter O’Neill’s resignation as PNG prime minister in May 2019, his government had withheld promised funds for the ABG and referendum, and insiders claimed he was reluctant to ratify any “yes” vote for independence.
This added uncertainty and considerable tension to the peace process.
However, Bougainvilleans are encouraged by early signals that the new Marape government supports the referendum process, with funding for the referendum released in its first week of government.
The appointment of veteran politician Sir Puka Temu as the Minister for Bougainville Affairs was also well received in Bougainville.
Australia is trying to balance its close relationship with PNG with supporting the ABG as it manages its current autonomy status and prepares for a referendum on independence.
So far, the peace process has proven successful, but there are key questions over the ABG’s capacity to conduct a rigorous referendum; Port Moresby’s readiness to honour the result if the vote is “yes”; and, the role Australia should play before and after the event.
With the real possibility of a new nation emerging in Australia’s immediate region for the first time since Timor Leste, it is essential to understand what is at stake for Australia and the region and how best to manage the process and outcome.
Australia should navigate carefully its relationships with both PNG and the people of Bougainville to support the peace process and a free and fair referendum without being seen to influence the outcome.
If the outcome of the referendum is an overwhelming vote for independence, Canberra must be prepared for two possibilities: either the creation of a newly independent nation in the region, or a crisis unfolding in the region if the PNG government refuses to ratify the result.

An embattled island Taim bifo
(the time before)

The two main islands of Bougainville and Buka and a number of smaller island groups and atolls are all part of PNG’s Autonomous Region of Bougainville, formerly known as North Solomons Province (NSP).
It lies to the east of mainland Papua New Guinea and close to the border of neighbouring Solomon Islands.
Bougainville has a population approaching 300 000 people with 19 main language groups.
Bougainvilleans claim that their traditional trade links and affinities before European contact were mainly with those of the western and central islands of the Solomons chain rather than with the PNG mainland.
There was also substantial contact with seafaring Polynesians who came to trade and settle in some of the outlying atolls.
The first recorded European contact with Bougainville was by the French explorer Admiral Louis Antoine de Bougainville in July 1768. De Bougainville named the main island after himself but the French never settled it.
In the late 1800s, Germany claimed northern New Guinea and its islands, including Bougainville.
Settlers established large copra plantations, and the largest of them, the German Neuguinea-Kompagnie, informally assumed the role of administrator.
The German administration of New Guinea, including Bougainville, came to an end in 1914 at the outbreak of World War I when the Australian military took control of the island.
As a result of lobbying by Prime Minister Billy Hughes after the war, the League of Nations assigned the former German territory of New Guinea to Australia to administer.
From 1918 to 1975 – interrupted by Japanese occupation during World War II – Bougainville was administered by Australia, first as a mandated territory on behalf of the League of Nations, then as a “trust” territory on behalf of the United Nations following the war.

The emergence of Bougainvillean identity

Before colonisation, Bougainville and Buka (the island to its north) shared little in the sense of island nationalism or ethnicity.
The arrival of European rule changed this, with grievances against the colonial regimes driving the island populations together towards the semblance of a pan-Bougainville identity.
Perhaps the strongest factor in entrenching this Bougainvillean identity, however, was the establishment of the Panguna copper and gold mine near Arawa in the 1960s and early 1970s during the period of Australian colonial administration.
The mine was operated by Bougainville Copper Ltd (BCL), an Australian subsidiary of Rio Tinto, and sought to tap large deposits of copper, gold and silver in the Emperor mountain range.
While the arrival of the mine brought infrastructure and helped to modernise Bougainville, perceived inequities in the distribution of compensation and revenue alienated local communities.
From the start, the mine had provoked protests, with local women pulling out survey markers and standing in front of bulldozers.

  • Next week, we delve into the shift to autonomy, war, the peace agreement, the referendum and more.

– Lowly Institute