Morobe loses land appeal
The National, Monday 05th March 2012
By ANGELINE KARIUS
THE Supreme Court has dismissed an appeal by the Morobe provincial government against a decision of the National Court in relation to an eviction exercise carried out in January 2002.
A three-man bench comprising Justices David Cannings, George Manuhu and Steven Kassman last Thursday ruled that the eviction was “harsh, oppressive, inhumane and not reasonably justifiable in a democratic society having no inherent dignity of the human person”.
The appeal was dismissed in its entirety.
The first appellant was the Morobe provincial government, Morobe provincial administrator Manasupe Zurenuoc, Lae Urban Local-Level Government council manager Patilius Gamato and John Kameku for himself and on behalf of Yonggo Mountain settlers.
The said government had conducted an eviction exercise at Yonggo Mountain settlement, in Lae.
Settlers led by respondent John Kameku, did not dispute that the land on which they had been living for up to 50 years was government land but claimed they were treated harshly and oppressively.
They started proceedings in National Court seeking equitable interest in the land and that the conduct of the provincial government and related parties was harsh, oppressive and unlawful.
The matter went to trial before Justice Moses Jalina who refused to declare that the settlers had any equitable interest in the land, granted a declaration under section 41 of Constitution that the eviction, which gave 30 days notice to quit to settlers who had lived on the land without any objection for up to 50 years.
and erected permanent buildings and engaged themselves in small scale commercial ventures on it, harsh, oppressive, inhuman and not reasonably justifiable in a democratic society having no inherent dignity of the human person.
Although damages were sought at the trial, the judge refused to award any holding as damages had not been sought in the originating summons, any claim for damages would have to be the subject of separate proceedings.
The bench dismissed half of the grounds of appeal because they raised points of law that were not argued before the National Court, and leave had been neither sought nor granted to argue them.
Other grounds of appeal were dismissed as they challenged findings of fact by primary Judge erred in any respect.
The primary judge’s determination as to unlawfulness for the purposes of Section 41 of the Constitution was made on the basis of evidence before the court, following a proper process of reasoning and involved no error of law.