NMSA wants tough new measures

THE National Maritime Safety Authority has made eight recommendations in a report to the government that includes taking punitive measures against vessel operators, masters and crew for criminal negligence when their vessels are found to be operating unsafely.
It conducted a preliminary investigation into the sinking of passenger ferry mv Rabaul Queen on Feb 2, and the report, delivered to the government just weeks after the ferry sank, remained unpublicised until it surfaced as an exhibit during a Commission of Inquiry between April 11 and June 6.
Its investigation into the nation’s worst maritime disaster in which more than 100 people perished was conducted between Feb 7 and Feb 15.
Among other recommendations, the investigation team headed by Capt Richard Teo, principal of the PNG Maritime College, called for:
lThe entire PNG Merchant Shipping Act 1975, chapter 242 to be reviewed  on an urgent basis in order to prevent another similar occurrence;
lDetention of responsible ship’s crew in the event of any marine incident that causes hurt, injury or death and/or potential damage to property and the environment;
lSuspension of the certificates of competency of any qualified crewman pending the outcome of the commission of inquiry; and
lIn the event, a vessel operator operates a fleet of ships, the suspension of fleet operations until all operating ships have been inspected and passed as safe to operate.
The six-member investigation team made 14 findings from the information it received at the time.
Survivors and crew told the NMSA inquiry that the Japan-built ship was overcrowded, listed to the port side and they experienced very rough seas, strong winds with waves up to 3m high (the weather forecast was for winds of 15-20 knots and sea state of 1.5 to 2m – conditions that did not unduly concern both owner Peter Sharp and skipper Anthony Tsiau as this was expected at that time of year).
It, however, conceded that the true conditions may have caused some exaggeration in survivors’ descriptions.
“This would not be an uncommon observation on a small ship that was purportedly overloaded,” the NMSA report said.
 “Being listed to one side with very little freeboard and an unsteady, unstable ship would have magnified the effect of strong wind, heavy seas, not to mention the fear and worry that would have been mounting already.
 “The weather reports did not indicate severe weather conditions that would have prevented the ship from continuing its voyage.
“The vessel was impacted by three waves. The first increased the port list or heel.
“The second caused a larger list or heel and the master lost steerage and subsequent control of the ship as he could not hold course. The third was broadside and likely caused the ship to capsize.
“It is reasonable to believe that the vessel’s stability had gradually diminished during the voyage from Kimbe to Lae.
“No fit and proper action was taken by the master and crew to examine the vessel’s stability.
“The master and crew would not have been able to determine what the state of stability was without stability data and hydrostatics particulars but could have at least taken actions to investigate the cause of the heel or list and reduce top weight and free surface effect as necessary.
“The master allowed the vessel to become unstable,” the report alleged.
“The vessel was not operated safely to ensure that passengers and crew were prepared for such an emergency. There was no passenger on board management procedure in place.
“The master and crew did not count nor check the number of passengers that boarded in order to ensure that it was not overloaded or breached its capacity.
“The master and crew were nervous and appeared restrained during the meeting with the team at Rabaul.
“They were conscious of the operator’s (Peter Sharp) staff in the background and had at times looked like volunteering fresh information but were unable to.
“The vessel’s Registration Certificate and Certificate of Survey did not specify clearly whether a passenger safety certificate was incorporated in the certificate. Survey reports did not include examination of load lines and/or freeboard items.
“The carriage of simplified stability data was not verified. No exemptions were mentioned.”
Among the probable causes for the vessel capsizing that the report outlined were:
lOvercrowding and overloading of passengers by at least 50 persons and their baggage and personal cargoes (the 42m ship was surveyed to safely carry a maximum number 295 unberthed passengers and a minimum of 10 crew);
lExcessive top weight without ballasting capability, i.e. unable to compensate by adding bottom weight ;
lInability to dispose of superfluous top weight such as baggages or other items to help lower the centre of gravity of the ship;
lConstant shifting of weights between lower and upper decks and from port to starboard and starboard to port aggravating rise of the centre of gravity of the ship;
lProbable water ingress in the lower deck;
lA port heel or list left un–investigated and no precautionary measures taken;
lThe master and crew not comprehending or knowing the need for stability data and hydrostatic particulars for the ship.

lThe master not operating the vessel safely; and,
lLikelihood of some damage to the ship that may have needed temporary repairs using cement containment.  Cement is quite often used to contain hull leaks and piping. When mixed correctly and allowed time to set can be effective for a while depending on where and what it is meant to contain.