Achieving a US-China strategic understanding

RELATIONS between the United States and China have been at a low point in recent months.
Tensions over US arms sales to Taiwan, president Barack Obama’s meeting with the Dalai Lama, disputes over the value of China’s currency, a supposed snub of Obama by Chinese leaders at December’s Copenhagen climate summit, and the rupture between Google and China have all played a role.
But president Hu Jintao’s visit to Washington for the nuclear security summit, which followed a phone conversation between him and Obama, has set the stage for a serious and calm exchange of views on a range of bilateral and international issues, including Iran’s nuclear programme.
This calming of the diplomatic atmosphere was helped considerably by US treasury secretary Timothy Geithner delaying his report to congress on whether or not China is a currency manipulator.
Geithner even made a quick stop in Beijing on April 8 to meet Chinese vice-premier Wang Qishan, prompting reports that China may let the renminbi float more flexibly.
Nevertheless, before anyone concludes that US-China ties are warming up, it is worth noting that the two countries have starkly different views on how to manage their relationship.
Take the recent Obama-Hu telephone conversation.
Reports in the US following the hour-long exchange praised it as a turning point in bilateral relations, and headlines emphasised that Obama worked on Hu to achieve a common stand in sanctioning Iran over its pursuit of nuclear weapons.
Yet Chinese news releases gave no indication of such a “breakthrough”.
Instead, they stressed Hu’s demand that the US side “properly handled” the Taiwan and Tibet issues, which represent China’s “core interests”.
There was not even a mention that the two leaders discussed Iran, other than one line saying that they exchanged views on international issues of common concern.
Such discrepancies reflect a broader perception gap.
On the American side, the emerging consensus is that the Obama administration began its term committed to working closely with China on a range of issues.
It took extra steps in not being openly critical of China’s currency policy, launched the high-profile US-China strategic and economic dialogue, delayed a meeting with the Dalai Lama prior to Obama’s China trip, and showed substantial patience with China’s concerns at the Copenhagen conference.
But that conciliatory approach, which brought down on Obama domestic criticism, did not seem to be appreciated by the Chinese.
Instead, China displayed sharp anger at the US arms sale to Taiwan, something that has been going on for decades, and to Obama’s low-key meeting with the Dalai Lama.
Many in the Obama administration now ask: what is the point of being nice when there are no obvious benefits?
On the Chinese side, the initial accommodating approach by Obama, although met with a level of caution and skepticism, was perceived as an inevitable reflection of China’s rise and more equal status with the US.
After all, many argue, China continues to buy US treasury bonds and now shoulders the largest amount of US debt, thus financing whatever the Americans are doing, from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to health-care reform at home.
China has played a vital role in getting the global economy onto a speedier path to recovery, thanks to its effective stimulus package.
China is also expected to help resolve the nuclear standoffs with North Korea and Iran, two counties that are hostile to the US but less of a threat to China.
So China’s leaders felt a sense of betrayal when Obama, shortly after his positive visit to Beijing, went ahead with the arms sales to Taiwan and the meeting with the Dalai Lama. Many mainstream, liberal-minded Chinese academics complain that there is no fresh US approach to China. – Project Syndicate
nWenran Jiang is chair of the China institute at the university of Alberta and senior fellow of the Asia Pacific foundation of Canada. He is a former public policy fellow at the Woodrow Wilson international centre for scholars in Washington DC